Description of the strategic operation Battle of the Dnieper




1 description of strategic operation

1.1 initial attack
1.2 progress of offensive
1.3 dnieper airborne operation
1.4 assault-crossing dnieper
1.5 securing lodgements
1.6 lower dnieper offensive





description of strategic operation
initial attack

despite great superiority in numbers, offensive no means easy. german opposition ferocious , fighting raged every town , city. wehrmacht made extensive use of rear guards, leaving troops in each city , on each hill, slowing down soviet offensive.


progress of offensive

three weeks after start of offensive, , despite heavy losses on soviet side, became clear germans not hope contain soviet offensive in flat, open terrain of steppes, red army s numerical strength prevail. manstein asked many 12 new divisions in hope of containing soviet offensive – german reserves perilously thin.


on 15 september 1943, hitler ordered army group south retreat dnieper defence line. battle poltava bitter. city heavily fortified , garrison prepared. after few inconclusive days slowed down soviet offensive, marshal konev decided bypass city , rush towards dnieper. after 2 days of violent urban warfare, poltava garrison overcome. towards end of september 1943, soviet forces reached lower part of dnieper.


dnieper airborne operation

(the following is, largely, synopsis of account glantz support account staskov.)


stavka detached central front s 3rd tank army voronezh front race weakening germans dnieper, save wheat crop german scorched earth policy, , achieve strategic or operational river bridgeheads before german defence stabilize there. 3rd tank army, plunging headlong, reached river on night of 21–22 september and, on 23rd, soviet infantry forces crossed swimming , using makeshift rafts secure small, fragile bridgeheads, opposed 120 german cherkassy flak academy nco candidates , hard-pressed 19th panzer division reconnaissance battalion. forces germans within 60 km of dnieper loop. heavy german air attack , lack of bridging equipment kept soviet heavy weaponry crossing , expanding bridgehead.


the soviets, sensing critical juncture, ordered hasty airborne corps assault increase size of bridgehead before germans counterattack. on 21st, voronezh front s 1st, 3rd , 5th guards airborne brigades got urgent call secure, on 23rd, bridgehead perimeter 15 20 km wide , 30 km deep on dnieper loop between kaniv , rzhishchev, while front elements forced river.


the arrival of personnel @ airfields slow, necessitating, on 23rd, one-day delay , omission of 1st brigade plan; consequent mission changes caused near chaos in command channels. mission change orders got down company commanders, on 24th, 15 minutes before units, not yet provisioned spades, anti-tank mines, or ponchos autumn night frosts, assembled on airfields. owing weather, not assigned aircraft had arrived @ airfields on time (if @ all). further, flight safety officers disallowed maximum loading of aircraft. given fewer aircraft (and lower expected capacities), master loading plan, ruined, abandoned. many radios , supplies got left behind. in best case, take 3 lifts deliver 2 brigades. units (still arriving over-taxed rail system), loaded piecemeal onto returned aircraft, slow refuel owing less-than-expected capacities of fuel trucks. meanwhile, already-arrived troops changed planes, seeking earlier flights. urgency , fuel shortage prevented aerial assembly aloft. aircraft, loaded , fueled, flew in single file, instead of line abreast, dropping points. assault waves became intermingled units carried.


as corps elements made flights, troops (half of whom had never jumped, except training towers) briefed on drop zones, assembly areas , objectives poorly understood platoon commanders still studying new orders. meanwhile, soviet aerial photography, suspended several days bad weather, had missed strong reinforcement of area, afternoon. non-combat cargo pilots ferrying 3rd brigade through drizzle expected no resistance beyond river pickets but, instead, met anti-aircraft fire , starshells 19th panzer division (only coincidentally transiting drop zone, , 1 of 6 divisions , other formations ordered, on 21st, fill gap in front of 3rd tank army). lead aircraft, disgorging paratroopers on dubari @ 1930, came under fire elements of 73rd panzer grenadier regiment , division staff of 19th panzer division. paratroops began returning fire , throwing grenades before landing; trailing aircraft accelerated, climbed , evaded, dropping wide. through night, pilots avoided starshell-lit drop points entirely, , 13 aircraft returned airfields without having dropped @ all. intending 10 14 km drop on largely undefended terrain, soviets instead achieved 30 90 km drop on fastest mobile elements of 2 german corps.


on ground, germans used white parachutes beacons hunt down , kill disorganized groups , gather , destroy airdropped supplies. supply bonfires, glowing embers, , multi-color starshells illuminated battlefield. captured documents gave germans enough knowledge of soviet objectives arrive @ of them before disorganized paratroops.


back @ soviet airfields, fuel shortage allowed 298 of 500 planned sorties, leaving corps anti-tank guns , 2,017 paratroops undelivered. of 4,575 men dropped (seventy percent of planned number, , 1,525 5th brigade), 2,300 assembled 43 ad-hoc groups, missions abandoned hopeless, , spent of time seeking supplies not yet destroyed germans. others joined 9 partisan groups operating in area. 230 made on (or out of) dnieper front units (or dropped there). of rest casually captured first night or killed next day (although, on first night, 3rd co, 73rd panzer grenadier regiment, suffered heavy losses while annihilating 150 paratroopers near grushevo, 3 km west of dubari).


the germans underestimated 1,500 2,000 had dropped; recorded 901 paratroops captured , killed in first 24 hours. thereafter, largely ignored soviet paratroopers, counterattack , truncate dnieper bridgeheads. germans deemed anti-paratrooper operations completed 26th, although modicum of opportunistic actions against garrisons, rail lines, , columns conducted remnants november. lack of manpower clear areas, forests of region remain minor threat.


the germans called operation fundamentally sound idea ruined dilettantism of planners lacking expert knowledge (but praised individual paratroops tenacity, bayonet skills , deft use of broken ground in sparsely wooded northern region). stavka deemed second (and, ultimately, last) corps drop complete failure; lessons knew had learned winter offensive corps drop @ viazma had not stuck. never trust try again.


soviet 5th guards airborne brigade commander sidorchuk, withdrawing forests south, amassed brigade-size command, half paratroops, half partisans; obtained air supply, , assisted 2nd ukrainian front on dnieper near cherkassy link front forces on 15 november. after 13 more days combat, airborne element evacuated, ending harrowing 2 months. more sixty percent never returned.


assault-crossing dnieper

soviet soldiers preparing rafts cross dnieper (the sign reads onwards kiev! )


the first bridgehead on dnieper s western shore established on 22 september 1943 @ confluence of dnieper , pripyat rivers, in northern part of front. on 24 september, bridgehead created near dniprodzerzhynsk, on 25 september near dnipropetrovsk , yet on 28 september near kremenchuk. end of month, 23 bridgeheads created on western side, of them 10 kilometers wide , 1-2 kilometres deep.


the crossing of dnieper extremely difficult. soldiers used every available floating device cross river, under heavy german fire , taking heavy losses. once across, soviet troops had dig clay ravines composing dnieper s western bank.


securing lodgements

soviet soldiers attacking on lodgement in october 1943


german troops launched heavy counterattacks on every bridgehead, hoping annihilate them before heavy equipment transported across river.


for instance, borodaevsk lodgement, mentioned marshal konev in memoirs, came under heavy armored attack , air assault. bombers attacked both lodgement , reinforcements crossing river. konev complained @ once lack of organization of soviet air support, set air patrols prevent bombers approaching lodgements , ordered forward more artillery counter tank attacks opposite shore. when soviet aviation became more organized , hundreds of guns , katyusha rocket launchers began firing, situation started improve , bridgehead preserved.


such battles commonplace on every lodgement. although lodgements held, losses terrible – @ beginning of october, divisions @ 25 50% of nominal strength.


lower dnieper offensive

german soldiers manning defensive positions on dnieper


by mid-october, forces accumulated on lower dnieper bridgeheads strong enough stage first massive attack secure river s western shore in southern part of front. therefore, vigorous attack staged on kremenchuk-dnipropetrovsk line. simultaneously, major diversion conducted in south draw german forces away both lower dnieper , kiev.


at end of offensive, soviet forces controlled bridgehead 300 kilometers wide , 80 kilometers deep in places. in south, crimea cut off rest of german forces. hope of stopping red army on dnieper s east bank lost.








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