1 weaknesses
1.1 defective weaponry
1.2 defective fortifications
1.3 obsolescence
1.4 lack of tautness in chain boom
1.5 supplying garrison
weaknesses
in fact, humaitá not invulnerable, @ rate after sufficient supply of river-navigating ironclad warships became available in south america. indeed burton, having inspected captured site, thought potency had been exaggerated – point bluff. commander of portuguese war vessel zarco, there @ time, wondered how humaitá have humbled powerful navy long.
defective weaponry
the last remaining paraguayan artillery pieces @ humaitá collected distribution between allies war booty. there sundry old tubes bearing arms of spain; 2 hailed seville, san gabriel (a.d. 1671) , san juan de dios (1684) .
although paraguay , did manufacture large artillery guns, there nevertheless shortage—partly because guns had taken reinforce landward artillery – , not of guns @ humaitá of acceptable standard. when burton inspected them (august 1868) noted many had been thrown deep water remainder poor:
the guns barely deserve name; of them honeycombed must have been used street posts... not worst of them made @ asunción or ibicuy, furnaces , air chimneys melt 4 tons per diem. had been converted, mere patchwork. few rifled 12-pounders had been cast @ asunción. there sundry old tubes bearing arms of spain; 2 hailed seville, san gabriel (a.d. 1671) , san juan de dios (1684).
however, burton may have been underestimating paraguayan artillery @ zenith: according both thompson , jourdan, guns had been evacuated chaco side paraguayans when abandoning fortress. gunboat hms dotterel, while anchored @ humaitá 3 hours in june 1865, river counted 116 guns, number far greater recorded burton or jourdan when inspecting captured fortress.
defective fortifications
according burton system of fortification lacked latest developments, using obsolete en barbette system failed protect defending artillerymen. consequence:
thus works utterly unfit resist developed powers of rifled artillery, concentrated discharge shipping, , accurate , searching fire of spencer carbine. londres work, besides being in state of decay, exposed mass of masonry ought have shared fate of forts sumpter pulaski, , when granite fails bricks cannot hope succeed. had guns been mounted in monitor towers, or protected sand-bags, ironclads have suffered more did in running past them.
other observers formed similar impressions. thompson wrote should have been easy brazilian flotilla firing grape , canister sweep paraguayans away guns . british gunboat hms doterel, had passed site in 1865 (long before damaged in war) likewise thought artillerymen far exposed, wrote british diplomat aboard doterel:
we counted 116 pieces of cannon, heavy , light, of these pieces, exception of 1 heavy battery of 16 guns [the londres], en barbette, , crews of guns utterly unprotected shell, canister, or rifle bullets. regards heavy 16-gun casemated battery, embrasures appear wrongly constructed, according modern ideas on such subjects, large aperture of embrasure facing enemy, , becoming excellent target riflemen, of bullets must tell on crew of gun within.
obsolescence
uss monitor, first monitor (1861).
lópez fortified humaitá in era of wooden paddle-steamer warship. gloire, first ironclad warship not launched until 1859 , in france, intended blue-water navy; , no battles between european ironclads had happened.
however, evolution of navies in american civil war (1861–65) had fulfilled demand heavily armoured vessels navigate in river waters. battle of hampton roads, in iron-armoured union , confederate warships unable sink each other, dramatically demonstrated resistance heavy artillery. news of naval engagement arrived in river plate on 14 may 1862 , reported in buenos aires standard in these terms:
the 2 steel vessels commenced cannonade mile apart, without doing damage on either side. in less hour , half alongside, , raged terrible encounter both vessels enveloped in smoke. 2 balls monitor entered adversary s cuirass; wind cleared away smoke monitor seen running round merrimac, looking vulnerable point, vessels being 35 yards apart ...
the merrimac drove spur against monitor, received awful shock motionless , unhurt. close guns fired each others mouths: @ length confederate got wound made hail others tow norfolk. after terrible conflict several hours against heavy artillery, monitor showed few dinges , scratches. merrimac s spur scarcely marked side.
the superiority established of steel-clad vessels has caused immense sensation in america ...
the american sea-fight caused great excitement in england, since feared new invention rob country of naval supremacy. wooden men of war declared, in house of commons, useless, , admiralty had stopped fortifications , arsenals, devote attention construction of steel fleet 35 in number.
apart more conventional ironclads, brazilian navy order britain or france, noted americans had invented monitor, armoured, shallow draft, turreted vessel presented little superstructure enemy fire; monitors , built in brazil. time lopez ii fired first shots against brazil (december 1864) humaitá defences obsolescent latest naval weaponry manufactured or purchased. brazil enormous country , after war broke out have (and did have) @ least 10 ironclads.
that said, ironclad naval force, itself, unlikely pose strategic threat paraguayan nation. assuming latest ironclads past humaitá – did – did not follow unarmoured troopships so. without logistical support of invading army, ironclads not have operated far ahead of lines of supply, except temporarily.
lack of tautness in chain boom
chain boom. thompson critical of design of chain boom @ humaitá. @ fortín designed chain boom made of timbó logs joined endwise iron shackles. since floated underwater not sunk naval gunfire.
even heavily armoured vessels might have been impeded chain boom, turned out have achilles heel: not drawn tight enough without intermediate floating supports – , these might sunk naval gunfire.
burton s description of chain boom was:
the chain, consisted of 7 twisted together, passed diagonally through kind of brick tunnel. on side [of river paraguay] made fast windlass supported house 100 yards bank. nearer battery stood still larger capstan: latter, however, wanted force haul tight chain.
this provided enemy destroyed chain s intermediate floating supports; explained thompson, chains were
supported on number of canoes, , on 3 pontoons. [brazilian] ironclads fired 3 months @ these pontoons , canoes, sinking of them, when, of course, chain went bottom, river there 700 yards wide, , chain not drawn tight without intermediate supports. chain buried 2 feet under mud of river, offering no obstacle whatever navigation.
supplying garrison
because marshlands not ideal raising of cattle or cultivation of manioc or maize, , because quadrilateral required large garrison, food humaitá needed brought in elsewhere. however, difficult position supply.
cut off swamps, there no easy overland communication nearest food-producing regions. there coastal road, poor, unfitted oxcarts or cattle droves during winter floods. during war there shortage of steam vessels; small river craft difficult land in winter. paraguay never resolved these transportation difficulties during siege of humaitá, , army suffered consequences , observed professor cooney.
even so, humaitá withstood siege of more 2 years.
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