Unintended consequences Fortress of Humaitá




1 unintended consequences

1.1 provocation of brazil
1.2 inducing overconfidence
1.3 alternative view





unintended consequences

francisco solano lópez ( lópez ii ), , autograph.


the humaitá system built increase security of paraguay, but, described, strength – real or perceived – may have had opposite effect in end.


provocation of brazil

for brazil fortifications posed potential threat own security , caused make preparations war. noted lt colonel george thompson of paraguayan army:



these batteries commanded whole bend of river, , paraguay made vessels anchor , ask permission before pass river. practicable road brazil had province of matto-grosso [sic], naturally disapproved of stoppage of river, , gradually accumulated large military stores in matto-grosso, view, no doubt, of day destroying humaitá.



inducing overconfidence



for leslie bethell, lópez ii overestimated paraguay s military power, , induced him behave recklessly. according professor bethell:



solano lópez s decision declare war first on brazil , on argentina, , invade both territories, proved serious miscalculation, , 1 have tragic consequences paraguayan people. @ least solano lópez made enormous gamble – , lost… solano lópez s reckless actions brought thing threatened security, existence, of country: union of 2 powerful neighbours …



for john hoyt williams, humaitá instrumental in generating risk-taking behaviour. according professor williams:



the hundreds of heavy calibre guns mounted @ humaitá , elsewhere, modern navy, railroad, telegraph, , munitions manufacturing establishments – helped bring horrendous war of triple alliance , own destruction providing hardware francisco solano lópez become mariscal , self-appointed arbiter of río de la plata.



and:



even el mariscal not have dared more defend immediate borders had not military materiel [williams expressly specifies humaitá] encouraged him redefine borders , play wider , infinitely more dangerous role of fulcrum in balance of power.



after passage of humaitá buenos ayres standard wrote:



none have ever seen place have questioned strength. old president lópez had such implicit faith in impregnability believed if xerxes attacked paraguay not past humaitá. same implicit confidence in strength inculcated in minds of paraguayan people. watchword humaitá , , possibly exaggerated idea of strength present lópez may traced grave political error step step led unfortunate man cautious policy of father become great champion of river plate equilibrium.



an alternative view

a possible alternative view lópez aware developments in naval warfare making humaitá obsolescent, , therefore decided take offensive before paraguay lost balance of advantage altogether. paraguay s chief engineer talented william keld whytehead cannot have failed become aware of advantages of ironclad vessels , on record in 1863 obtained british patent iron-cladded vessel. indeed lópez himself 8 months after battle of hampton roads pressing american ambassador in asunción procure monitor him; , paraguay placed orders several ironclads built in european or brazilian yards before war. further support view afforded lópez s hesitation in seizing marques de olinda. according thompson:



passage of humaitá armoured squadron of brazilian navy. engraving blanchard of sketch josé paranhos, (1819-1880), brazil s foreign minister. in propaganda coup, paranhos drew sketch imagination , sent french magazine l illustration, journal universel, predicting war on in month.



lópez @ cerro leon @ time [when marques de olinda arrived @ asunción], , hesitated whole day whether should break peace or not... [h]e knew assemble every man in country , raise large army; knew brazilians long time recruiting large force together, , did not think wish carry on war long. said, if don t have war brazil, shall have 1 @ less convenient time ourselves. therefore sent ... tacuarí (the fastest steamer on river plate) ... bring asunción.



as against that, none of sources cited in article establish why lópez declared war without waiting ironclads completed , delivered. according burton general opinion single ironclad @ disposal paraguayans have cleared river . went further:



the war, indeed, altogether premature: had cuirassed ships , whitworths ordered marshal-president begun campaign, might have supplied place of mexico third great latin empire.



instead, @ stage of war paraguay s wooden vessels, 1 of had been built warship, defeated brazilian wooden flotilla @ battle of riachuelo; hence river paraguay blockaded brazilian navy; , armoured ships had ordered neither delivered nor paid for. brazil negotiated shipbuilders transfer , complete work-in-progress, and, eventually, used these selfsame ironclads defeat humaitá.








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